We show that the entry of a second …rm in a horizontally di¤erenti-ated market (ala Hotelling) may harm consumers as prices increase and consumer's surplus possibly decrease. We …rst derive the price and the consumer's surplus of a monopoly which is located at the center of the market. When a second …rm enters the market the …rst …rm repositions and the two …rms locate at their equilibrium points. Although competition adds to variety and increases consumer's surplus, the post entry increase in price may outweight the gains from extra variety and make consumers worse o¤.
Introduction
We examine the e¤ects of repositioning on prices and consumer's surplus from the entry of a second …rm on a horizontally di¤erentiated market. Repositioning may take the form of a change in the physical location where the product is o¤ered: When a second …rm decides to sell a di¤erentiated product through a supermarket chain, the incumbent is posible to relocate its product on the shelves of these supermarkets in an e¤ort to minimize the consequences of the entry on its sales. Repositioning may also take the form of relocation in the product space: A number of various reasons such as a change in demographic parameters, demand shocks or mergers may make …rms to change the physical characteristics of their products. An example of successful repositioning in the face of competition is the response of MSNBC to Fox News. As Fox Channel ers locate in the same shopping center. The greater variety of products attracts more customers to the shopping center which might outweight the more intense competition within the shopping center. Here, there is no search as consumers have perfect information.
The result holds in markets with consumers belonging to a loyal group of consumers and a switching group. As the number of sellers increase, the size of the switching group per …rm decreases, and its incentive to exploit the captured consumers through a higher price increases. In Rosenthal (1980) the equilibrium prices are in mixed strategies. 1 This result has also been empirically documented in a number of horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated markets: Goolsbee and Syverson (2006) show that in the passenger airlines industry, competitors of Southwest Airlines raise route prices when Southwest opens new routes to the same destination from a nearby airport. Perlo¤ et al. (2005) show that new entry of di¤erentiated propriated anti-ulcer drugs raises prices in that market. Thomadsen (2007) provides evidence that prices may rise above the monopoly level with entry, in the fast food industry. Furthermore, Caves et al (1991) and Grabowski and Vernon (1992) provide evidence that the price of brand-name drugs in the U.S. increased after the entry of generic drug products. This happens as brand name manufacturers raise their prices to price discriminate when generics enter the market. Ward et al. (2002) show that the entry of private-label food products tend to raise the prices of name-brand products.
In independent work, Cowan and Yin (2008) show that welfare may decrease with competition with the entry of a second …rm when transportation cost is linear. They assume that a monopolist is locating at the one end of the Hotelling line, while in duopoly the new …rm locates at the other end of the line. Thus, they implicitly assume that there is no option of locating at an interior point within the line. However, Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) show that in this case the equilibrium locations for the two …rms will be within the market's quartiles. Here, we consider the equilibrium locations for the two …rms with linear and quadratic transportation cost and we compare them with a monopoly that is located at the center of the market space.
Linear transportation cost
We use the standard Hotelling's (1929) duopoly model assuming that consumers have a …nite reservation price for the di¤erentiated product as Lerner and Singer (1937) . Consumers are located uniformly at the [0; 1] interval. For simplicity, we normalize the total number of consumers to one. Each consumer buys one unit of the good. Initially, there is only one …rm in the market. The monopoly is located at the center of the characteristic space (as this is the optimal location for the monopoly) and maximizes its pro…ts by setting its price P M . In this section we assume linear transportation cost. The utility that a consumer, who is located at point x in the line, gets from buying the product from the monopoly 1 For a model of a similar ‡avour, see also Zhou (2006 
All consumers with nonnegative utility buy from the monopoly. Post entry, the monopoly relocates and the market can be described by the standard duopoly model. Let now the two …rms be A and B. Firm A is located at x A and B at 1 x B . The price each …rm sets is P i , where i = A; B. The utility that a consumer, who is located at point x in the line, gets from buying the product from …rm A, is:
and when he buys from …rm B is:
A consumer located at x solves:
where t is a positive real number which shows the unit transport cost. This speci…cation implies that strong preference for one …rm results in strong aversion to the other …rm by a factor t. V is the reservation price, that is the maximum price that a consumer who is located either at x A or 1 x B , is willing to pay for the good. Furthermore, to facilitate the analysis we set = t=V . Both …rms simultaneously determine where to locate and then simultaneously set their price. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on pure strategy symmetric location equilibria.
It is well known that when V is "high" relative to t, there is no pure strategy price-location equilibrium. 2 For higher values of we have two types of equilibria. More speci…cally, for 2 we have touching equilibria with full supply. In this type of equilibria, the two …rms locate at the market's quartiles. Again, each …rm covers half the market only. Firms set high prices, so that and the utility of the consumers at x = 0; x = 1 and x = 1 2 is zero. For > 2 the two …rms form two local monopolies and do not compete. 3 We consider values of for which the optimal price of the monopoly is an interior solution. We derive the price, the consumer's surplus and welfare of the monopoly that, before entry, is located at the center of the product space. We then do the same using the duopoly model for the various parameters of and the corresponding locations for the two …rms. We compare the results in the two models and show that post entry prices can not decrease. Also, there are values of for which the consumer's surplus is greater before entry. We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 With linear transportation cost, the optimal price for the monopoly that is located at x = 1 2 is an interior solution for
1. All consumers in [ The proof can be easily derived if we compare the prices and the consumer's surplus in the two models from Lemma 1 for the various values of and can be found in the Appendix.
We …rst compare the consumer's surplus of the monopoly with that of the duopoly models when . Notice that the ratio of the duopoly price over the monopoly price t=2 V =2 = increases as increase. On the other hand, as increases the monopoly sells to less consumers (the monopoly's market share is
Recall that in the duopoly model, the two …rms always cover the whole market. As increases, the e¤ect of higher prices dominates the e¤ect of the increased variety on consumer's surplus. As a result, the consumer's surplus is higher in the monopoly model for high values of (i.e. when 2 ( We now compare the consumer's surplus of the monopoly with that of the duopoly models when 4 3 2. Here, the ratio of the prices in the two
= 2 2 decreases with . In addition, as increases, as before, the monopoly sells to less consumers. As a result, the consumer's surplus is higher in the monopoly model for low values of , i.e. when 2 [ ; p 2). In Figures 1 and 2 we compare the consumer's surplus when V = 2. For this V the acceptable values of t in the two models are: t 2 16 7 ; 4 in the duopoly model and t 2 [2; 1) in the monopoly model. The two models can be compared 4 The price remains the same when = 2. Figure  2 ). Notice that for these values of t the di¤erence in the prices between the two models (in Figure 1) is high. In Figure 3 we examine the consumer's surplus when = enjoy a substantially higher surplus in the monopoly model.
Quadratic transportation cost
We now assume quadratic transportation cost. As before, the monopoly is initially located at the center of the market. 5 A consumer who buys from the monopoly has utility:
and consumers with nonnegative utility buy from the monopoly. Post entry, the monopoly relocates and the market can again be described by the standard duopoly model. The utility that a consumer who is located at point x in the line gets from buying the product from A is:
and the utility he gets when he buys from B is:
We follow the analysis of Chrico et. al (2003) that give the various equilibrium locations for the two …rms. 6 . Consumer's surplus remains the same for = 
mass of consumers around 1 2 . However, the monopoly price is smaller than the price in the duopoly model for both types of equilibria. 8 Although the consumers who are located around x A and 1 x B enjoy a positive surplus this is much smaller than the surplus that enjoy the consumers around the center before entry. For this reason, the consumer surplus is greater in the monopoly, for low values of .
In Figures 4, 5 . For all vales of t the monopoly charges smaller prices (Figure 4) . The consumer's surplus is higher in the monopoly model when t < (in the interval ab in Figure 5 ). Notice that for these 7 The above hold also for 2 [
33
; 16 20 ). However, in this range of , the two …rms are located outside of [0; 1], a possibility that we do not examine. 8 The price remains the same when = . 7 values of t the di¤erence between the prices in the two models is high. In Figure  6 we examine the consumer's surplus when = consumers around the center of the characteristic space (the consumer's surplus is given by the area (edjk)). On the other hand the two …rms in the duopoly model serve the whole market (the consumer's surplus is given by the area (cdh) plus the area (hjl)). Although (a) all consumers buy in the duopoly model and (b) both the consumers around x = 1 4 and around x = 3 4 enjoy a high surplus, the total consumer's surplus post entry is smaller (the area (dhj) is greater than the area (cde) plus the area (kjl)). This happens as the consumers around 1 2 enjoy a substantially higher surplus in the monopoly model.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. First notice that the monopoly maximizes its pro…ts when it is located at x = 1 2 . The monopoly charges price P M . All consumers located at x such that V tj . Its pro…ts are:
The monopoly sets price P M = V 2 to maximize its pro…ts. From (1) the monopoly's pro…ts are 1. To analyze the duopoly it su¢ces to examine …rm A as we focus on symmetric equilibria. Also, we do not examine the case where 2 (0; 8 7 ) as for that range there is no pure strategy symmetric equilibrium in prices and locations. As mentioned above, we do not consider the case where 2 (2; 1) as for that range the two …rms form two local monopolies.
From Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) , for 2 [ and the price A sets is P A = V t 4 . As the total market is covered, the total pro…ts for both …rms are V 3 ) the di¤erence in consumer's surplus between the monopoly and the duopoly models is:
The di¤erence is zero for t = V and t = 
post entry the price increases, and only for = 2 prices remain the same. For 2 [ which is positive for < p 2, and zero for = p 2. Proof of Lemma 3: Proof. We now examine the monopoly at x = 1 2 model. The consumer at x who buys from the monopolist who is located at x = 1 2 and charges price P M has utility V t 1 2 x 2 P M . The price P M is such that the marginal consumer who is located at x has zero surplus. We therefore have:
The monopolist who is located at x = 1 2 maximizes its pro…ts:
From the …rst order condition we have P M = . As we require 0 x 1 we also require V 
